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THE IMPACT OF STURGEON II ON
ALASKA SUBSISTENCE
MANAGEMENT: A CHANCE FOR
PEACE IN THE JURISDICTION WARS
Craig Jones*
ABSTRACT
In Sturgeon v. Frost, the Supreme Court addressed the status of navigable
waters in Alaska’s conservation system units. In holding that these waters are
not “public lands” for the purposes of ANILCA, the Court limited the ability
of the federal government to regulate them. In a footnote, Sturgeon preserved
the longstanding Katie John trilogy of Ninth Circuit precedent regarding
subsistence rights. This new jurisdictional framework has the potential to cause
problems for subsistence management in Alaska. This Note addresses these
potential consequences and proposes possible steps to create a more harmonized
subsistence management system through greater cooperation between the
federal government, the State, and subsistence users.

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 26, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its unanimous opinion
in Sturgeon v. Frost (Sturgeon II).1 The Court held that the National Parks
Service (NPS) did not have the authority to regulate navigable waters in
Alaska’s conservation system units (CSUs).2 This decision concludes the
latest battle in a decades long jurisdictional turf war over who controls
Alaska CSUs, the State of Alaska or the federal government. The front line
of this war has traditionally been the management of Alaskan natural
resources for subsistence harvest. Caught in the crossfire are Alaska
Natives, many of whom depend on subsistence lifestyles.3
Copyright © 2019 by Craig Jones.
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2020; B.A. Political
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1. 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019).
2. Id. at 1085.
3. Miranda Strong, Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act Compliance
& Nonsubsistence Areas: How Can Alaska Thaw out Rural & Alaska Native Subsistence
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While the Court attempted to dodge the subsistence issue in Sturgeon
II, its decision magnifies the battle lines. The question of Alaskan
subsistence management remains open, and the next moves by each party
will be critical. The first part of this Note situates Sturgeon II in the
statutory and judicial history of subsistence in Alaska. The following
discussion introduces the Sturgeon decisions and considers the possible
impact of Sturgeon II on subsistence management. The final part proposes
a truce in the subsistence jurisdiction wars, suggesting that Sturgeon II
might present new avenues for federal-state cooperation and the further
recognition of Alaska Native interests. This discussion includes two
proposals for policy change in response to the Court’s decision: 1)
increased cooperation through cooperative management plans, the
Alaska Land Use Council, and memoranda of understanding, and 2) a
state constitutional amendment recognizing rural subsistence rights.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In 2007, John Sturgeon was navigating the Nation River on his
hovercraft,4 traveling to his preferred moose hunting grounds.5 National
Parks Service (NPS) agents arrived and informed him that NPS
regulations prohibited the operation of hovercrafts in the Yukon-Charley
Rivers National Preserve.6 Sturgeon returned home empty-handed but
did not resign himself to the NPS regulations. Instead, he launched
litigation that spanned more than a decade and resulted in two trips to
the highest court in the land.
B. Statutory Background
1. ANILCA § 103(c)
Sturgeon’s desire to operate his hovercraft in the Yukon-Charley
preserve implicated a fundamental question about who has the authority
to regulate the navigable waters located in Alaska’s CSUs. The answer to
this question lies within the law that created Alaska’s CSUs, the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).7 However,
ANILCA is far from a model of clarity on this point. Section 103(c) states:
Rights?, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 71, 73 (2013).
4. Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1062 (2016).
5. Id. at 1064.
6. Id. at 1062.
7. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94
Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3101–3233. (2018)) [hereinafter ANILCA].
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Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation
system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined in
this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of such unit.
No lands which, before, on, or after [the date of ANILCA’s
enactment], are conveyed to the State, to any Native
Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the
regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units.
If the State, a Native Corporation, or other owner desires to
convey any such lands, the Secretary may acquire such lands in
accordance with applicable law (including this Act), and any
such lands shall become part of the unit, and be administered
accordingly.8
The Act defines “land” as “lands, waters, or interests therein.”9 “Public
lands” are defined as “land situated in Alaska which, [after the date of
ANILCA’s enactment] are Federal lands . . . .”10 Finally, “Federal land[s]”
under ANILCA are “lands the title to which is in the United States after
[the date of ANILCA’s enactment].”11
To summarize, public lands for the purposes of ANILCA are lands
to which the United States had title on December 2, 1980, when ANILCA
was enacted, as well as lands within CSUs acquired by the federal
government after that date. Only these “public lands” are “subject to the
regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units.”12 As a
practical matter, this section refers to NPS regulations. Other federal
regulations, for instance those issued by the EPA, are of general
applicability to both public and private lands, removing them from
103(c)’s purview. At first blush, this provision may seem trivial, but its
importance is highlighted by the presence of vast “inholdings”13 within
Alaska CSUs. Much of the land that falls within the boundaries of the
CSUs in Alaska is owned privately or by Alaskan Native corporations.
These inholdings are more prevalent in Alaska than elsewhere because in
ANILCA Congress chose to follow topographic or natural features rather
than property lines.14 Without section 103(c), these inholdings would be
8. Id. § 103(c), 94 Stat. 2371, 2377.
9. Id. § 102(1), 94 Stat. at 2375.
10. Id. § 102(3). This section contains an exception for federal lands that had
been selected by Native Alaskan corporations but had not yet been transferred.
This exception is not material in Sturgeon’s case.
11. Id. § 102(2).
12. Id. § 103(c).
13. Inholdings are pockets of privately owned land within the boundaries of
a federally designated national park, monument, or wilderness. Randy Tanner,
Inholdings within Wilderness: Legal Foundations, Problems, and Solutions, 8 INT’L J.
WILDERNESS 9, 9 (2002).
14. See ANILCA § 103(b) (“Whenever possible boundaries shall follow
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subject to NPS regulations along with all of the federally owned land in
the CSU.
2. The History of ANILCA
ANILCA resulted from years of legislative wrangling over the fate
of Alaska’s undeveloped land. The battle that led to ANILCA began with
the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA).15
Section 17(d)(2) of ANSCA resulted from an amendment proposed by
Nevada Senator Alan Bible with the support of conservationists.16 Section
17(d)(2) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to reserve up to eighty
million acres of land in Alaska for inclusion in the national park, forest,
wildlife refuge, and wild and scenic rivers systems.17 However, Congress
had the final authority to approve the withdrawals authorized by §
17(d)(2).18 Congress was required to act in response to the Secretary’s
proposed withdrawals before December 28, 1978.19 As the deadline
approached, Congress had not acted on the Secretary’s
recommendations.20 Further, the State of Alaska had selected nine to
eleven million acres located in the proposed section 17(d)(2) areas under
their Alaska Statehood Act21 entitlement.22 In response, President Carter
exercised his authority under the Antiquities Act of 190623 to create
seventeen new national monuments totaling fifty-six million acres located
in the section 17(d)(2) recommended areas.24 Carter also used his Federal
Land Policy and Management Act25 authority to reserve more land in
Alaska.26 In total, the President’s reservations exceeded 100 million
hydrographic divides or embrace other topographic or natural features.”).
15. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629 (2018)).
16. G. FRANK WILLISS, “DO THINGS RIGHT THE FIRST TIME”: ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY THE NATIONAL PARKS SERVICE AND THE ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS
CONSERVATION ACT OF 1980 Chapter 2 Section C (1985) (ebook).
17. CLAUS-M NASKE & HERMAN E. SLOTNICK, ALASKA, A HISTORY OF THE 49TH
STATE 225 (1987).
18. Id.
19. David Aaron Funk, The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
and the National Parks Service: A Primer on Access 2 (June 1990) (unpublished
Master’s thesis, University of Oregon) http://www.npshistory.com/
publications/anilca-nps-primer.pdf.
20. WALTER R. BORNEMAN, ALASKA SAGA: OF A BOLD LAND 504 (2003).
21. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958).
22. DANIEL NELSON, NORTHERN LANDSCAPES: THE STRUGGLE FOR WILDERNESS
ALASKA 220 (2004).
23. Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (codified at 54
U.S.C. § 3203 et seq.).
24. BORNEMAN, supra note 20, at 504.
25. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-579, 90
Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.).
26. Funk, supra note 19, at Chapter 4 Section E.
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acres.27
The Carter land reservations sparked political controversy in Alaska
and set the stage for ANILCA’s passage.28 Like the debates over ANSCA,
the legislative process leading to ANILCA pitted conservationists and
pro-development forces against each other.29 Alaska Native interests
were also determined to ensure that their rights were protected.30
Ultimately, ANILCA is a compromise statute, balancing conservation,
development, and subsistence use of Alaska’s lands.31

III. KATIE JOHN AND SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT IN ALASKA
The Sturgeon cases unfolded against the backdrop of Alaska’s
complex subsistence management history. In fact, the Sturgeon question
was not new. The Ninth Circuit had addressed the § 103(c) question
several times in a series of cases collectively known as the Katie John
trilogy. These decisions set the parameters of a patchwork state-federal
subsistence management system that took center stage in the Sturgeon
controversy. At a fundamental level, the Katie John decisions called upon
courts to consider some finer points of federal water law and their bearing
on the word “title” in ANILCA.
A. Federal Water Law
Understanding the holdings in Katie John and Sturgeon requires some
grasp of federal water law. In particular, the Equal Footing Doctrine, the
reserved water doctrine, and the navigational servitude loom large in the
section 103(c) controversy.
1. Equal Footing Doctrine
The Equal Footing Doctrine states that when a new state enters the
union it has the same rights and powers as the existing states.32 The exact
phrase “equal footing” has appeared in every act admitting a new state
since the addition of Tennessee in 1796.33 However, this language does
27. BORNEMAN, supra note 20.
28. Id. at 505.
29. Id.; see also NELSON, supra note 22, at 247–48.
30. James D. Linxwiler & Joseph J. Perkins, A Primer on Alaska Lands, 61 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7-37 (2015).
31. See NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 17, at 234–37 (documenting the interests
driving the passage of ANILCA and continuing controversies); see also Linxwiler
& Joseph, supra note 30 at 7-33–7-34.
32. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911) (“[W]hen a new State is
admitted to the Union, it is so admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and
jurisdiction which pertain to the original states . . . .”).
33. John Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519,
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not do much work on its own; the heart of the doctrine comes from Article
IV Section 3 of the Constitution, which says “[n]ew states may be
admitted by the Congress into this union.”34 From there, the Constitution
defines how these new states will relate to each other and the federal
government.35
The Equal Footing Doctrine is important in the context of water
rights primarily because of the Submerged Lands Act,36 which gives states
title to the land below navigable waters within their borders.37 When
Alaska became a state, it gained title to its submerged lands, except those
specifically reserved by the federal government.38
2. Federal Reserved Water Rights
The federal reserved water rights doctrine found its first expression
in Winters v. United States.39 Winters involved the water rights of the Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation, located on the Milk River in Montana.40
Conflict arose because diversions upriver from the reservation threatened
to deprive it of water.41 The Court protected the reservation’s water rights
from these intrusions; it held that when the United States created the
reservation and set it aside to be habitable and arable, it reserved the
water necessary to accomplish that purpose.42 In other words, the right to
water was “intrinsic to the purpose of the reservation in general.”43
Importantly, the Winters court rejected Montana’s Equal Footing Doctrine
argument that the state gained control over the waters when it entered
the union.44 Therefore, the states’ jurisdiction over submerged lands has

523 (1951).
34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
35. Hanna, supra note 33, at 522.
36. Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.).
37. Id.
38. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1997).
39. 207 U.S. 564 (1907).
40. Barbara Cosens, The Legacy of Winters v. United States and the Winters
Doctrine, One Hundred Years Later 6–7, in THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND FEDERAL
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS CENTENNIAL (Barbara Cosens & Judith V.
Royster eds. 2012).
41. Id. at 7.
42. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576–77.
43. Richard Monette, One Hundred Years After Winters: The Immovable Object
of Tribes’ Reserved Water Rights Meets the Irresistible Force of States’ Reserved Rights
Under the Equal Footing Doctrine 114, in THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND RESERVED
WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS CENTENNIAL (Barbara Cosens & Judith V. Royster eds.
2012).
44. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (“The power of the government to reserve the
waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied
. . . .”).
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no bearing on the federal government’s ability to reserve water rights.45
The Court has refined the reserved water rights doctrine over the
years, but its basic structure remains the same. For instance, in Cappaert v.
United States,46 the court applied the doctrine to preserve Devil’s Hole, a
subterranean pool in the Death Valley National Monument.47 The Court
said that “when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the
public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by
implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.”48
3. Navigational Servitude
The navigational servitude allows the government to use navigable
waters for purposes related to navigation and commerce and preserve
navigable waters for those purposes.49 The navigational servitude derives
from the Commerce power50 and has roots in English common law.51 The
servitude represents a public right of use.52 As such, the navigational
servitude does not convey ownership of any land or waters.53
B. The Katie John Decisions
1. Katie John I
When Sturgeon’s challenge to the NPS hovercraft ban reached the
Ninth Circuit, the panel heard the case against the backdrop of similar
cases that applied ANILCA § 103(c) in the context of subsistence
management. Each of these cases involved the same plaintiff, Katie John,
a respected Athabascan elder and advocate for subsistence rights.54
Alaska v. Babbitt55 (Katie John I) involved the rights of Ahtna
Athabascan Alaska Natives to continue subsistence fishing at the
Batzulnetas fishery near the confluence of Tanada Creek and the Copper
45. Id.; for a more complete discussion of the relationship between reserved
water rights and the Equal Footing Doctrine, see Monette, supra note 43.
46. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
47. Id. at 138.
48. Id.
49. Genevieve Pisarski, Testing the Limits of the Federal Navigational Servitude,
2 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 313, 313 (1997).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
51. RALPH J. GILLIS, NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDES: SOURCES, APPLICATIONS,
PARADIGMS 3 (2007).
52. Id. at 2.
53. City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1027 n.6 (9th Cir. 1986).
54. Julie Stricker, Athabascan elder Katie John receives honorary doctorate,
FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER (May 14, 2011), http://www.newsminer.com/
news/local_news/athabascan-elder-katie-john-receives-honorarydoctorate/article_df8d9ec6-383c-59e7-9bd6-592ce5d8357c.html.
55. 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995).
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River in Wrangell-St. Elias National Park.56 With the passage of ANSCA,
Congress extinguished aboriginal fishing rights.57 However, ANILCA
gave priority to rural residents to engage in subsistence uses such as
hunting and fishing on “public lands.”58 In administering this part of
ANILCA, the Secretary of the Interior adopted a regulatory definition of
public lands that excluded navigable waters.59 Katie John challenged this
definition because it limited the ability of Mentasa village residents to use
the Batzulnetas fishery.60
The question at the heart of Katie John I is the same as the
fundamental question presented in the Sturgeon II case: what is the
meaning of “public lands” under ANILCA and are navigable waters
included in that definition? In Katie John I the district court agreed with
the plaintiffs in holding that the navigational servitude brought navigable
waters within the scope of “public lands.”61 This holding was based on
the premise that the navigable servitude amounts to ownership of an
interest in navigable waters.62 The district court was also concerned with
the policy consequences of interpreting “public lands” narrowly,
excluding navigable waters that offer some of the best opportunities for
subsistence fishing.63
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling in
favor of Katie John but disagreed with the district court’s reasoning.64 The
circuit court rejected the idea that the navigational servitude gave the
United States “title” to an “interest” in navigable waters.65 The court
found this interpretation to contradict an earlier ANILCA case, City of
Angoon v. Hodel,66 which held that the navigational servitude does not

56. Id. at 699–700.
57. 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012).
58. ANILCA § 804, 94 Stat. at 2423 (“Except as otherwise provided in this Act
and other Federal laws, the taking on public lands of fish and wildlife for
nonwasteful subsistence uses shall be accorded priority over the taking on such
lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes.”).
59. Babbitt, 72 F.3d at 701.
60. Id.
61. John v. United States, No. A90-0484-CV (HRH), 1994 WL 487830, at *18
(D. Alaska Mar. 30, 1994).
62. See id. at *17 (“[T]he United States may be considered to own an ‘interest’
in property by virtue of the navigational servitude. The court concludes that, for
purposes of Title VIII of ANILCA, the United States holds title to an interest in the
navigable waters of Alaska.”). [R4.1]
63. See id. at *18 (“By limiting the scope of Title VIII to non-navigable
waterways, the Secretary has, to a large degree, thwarted Congress’ intent to
provide the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life to
continue to do so.”).
64. Babbitt, 72 F.3d at 704.
65. Id. at 703.
66. 803 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1986).
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give the United States title to navigable waters.67 Instead, the court found
that the federal reserved water rights doctrine was a more appropriate
avenue saying, “By virtue of its reserved water rights, the United States
has interests in some navigable waters. Consequently, public lands
subject to subsistence management under ANILCA include certain
navigable waters.”68
The court employed two disparate approaches to judicial
interpretation in coming to its conclusion in Katie John I. First, the court
rejected the district court’s navigational servitude approach on textualist
grounds, giving weight to the fact that the United States does not hold
“title” to that interest.69 However, the court did not seem concerned with
the question of whether the United States holds title to its interest derived
from the federal reserved waters doctrine.70 Here, the court recognizes its
more functionalist approach: “If we were to adopt the state’s position, that
public lands exclude navigable waters, we would give meaning to the
term ‘title’ in the definition of the phrase ‘public lands.’ But we would
undermine congressional intent to protect and provide the opportunity
for subsistence fishing.”71 The court gives meaning to the word title in one
part of the opinion while minimizing its importance in another. To their
credit, the court faced an exceptionally difficult task and “recognize[d]
that [its] holding may be inherently unsatisfactory.”72
2. Katie John II
Katie John I did not settle the issue. After the district court issued a
ruling on remand consistent with Katie John I, the Ninth Circuit took the
unusual step of voting to hear the case en banc before a three-judge panel
had an opportunity to review it.73 In John v. United States (Katie John II),74
the en banc court affirmed the district court’s decision with a oneparagraph opinion.75 This result effectively endorsed the holding in Katie
John I.
While the court adopted the Katie John I position, a concurring
opinion by Judge Tallman laid out an alternative vision of how ANILCA

67. See id. at 1027 n.6 (“Since the United States does not hold title to the
navigational servitude, the servitude is not ‘public land’ within the meaning of
ANILCA.”).
68. Babbitt, 72 F.3d at 703–04.
69. Id. at 702–03.
70. Id. at 703–04.
71. Id. at 704.
72. Id.
73. John v. United States, 216 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2000) (granting en banc
review).
74. 247 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
75. Id. at 1033.
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applies to navigable waters. Judge Tallman “[did] not believe Congress
intended the reserved water rights doctrine to limit the scope of
ANILCA’s subsistence priority.”76 Instead, he reasoned that Congress
invoked its Commerce Clause power to protect subsistence fishing in
Alaska.77 This interpretation relies in part on ANILCA’s declaration of
findings.78 If Congress intended federal authority in ANILCA CSUs to be
coextensive with the commerce power, the importance of the “title”
analysis would be greatly reduced. Like the district court in Katie John I,
Judge Tallman was concerned with the policy implications of removing
navigable waters from the subsistence priority.79 His Commerce Clause
approach represents a broad interpretation of the federal government’s
authority to regulate under ANILCA.
Representing the opposite end of the spectrum with respect to
federal authority, Judge Kozinski authored a dissenting opinion. He
started from the principle that “Alaska exercises sovereignty over the
beds of its navigable waters . . . its power to control navigation, fishing
and other public uses of the water above the beds is an incident of this
sovereignty.”80 Judge Kozinski was unwilling to find that Congress
intended to preempt that sovereignty without a “super-strong clear
statement.”81 In his estimation, ANILCA did not offer a clear statement
that the federal government intended to enter an area of traditional state
sovereignty.82
Judge Kozinski also used a textualist approach to arrive at what he
thought to be the most tenable interpretation of ANILCA. He reasoned
that since the federal reserved water doctrine does not grant “title” in the
conventional sense, “the . . . reserved water right is simply not sufficient

76. Id. at 1034 (Tallman, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 1035 (Tallman, J., concurring) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3111(4) (2012)).
78. See ANILCA § 801(4), 94 Stat. at 2422 (“[I]n order to fulfill the policies and
purposes of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and as a matter of equity, it
is necessary for the Congress to invoke its constitutional authority over Native
affairs and its constitutional authority under the property clause and the
commerce clause . . . .”).
79. See John, 247 F.3d at 1036 (Tallman, J., concurring) (“Given the crucial role
that navigable waters play in traditional subsistence fishing, it defies common
sense to conclude that, when Congress indicated an intent to protect traditional
subsistence fishing, it meant only the limited subsistence fishing that occurs in
non-navigable waters.”).
80. Id. at 1044 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Utah Div. of State Lands v.
United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987)).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 1050 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is far from clear that Congress
intended to take away the state’s traditional authority to control fishing in half of
the state’s navigable waters, as the majority implicitly holds, or in all of the state’s
navigable waters, as the concurrence would have it.”).
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to turn waters subject to that right into public lands.”83
While Katie John II affirmed the holding in Katie John I, it also
highlighted the lack of unanimity behind that position amongst the en
banc court.
3. Katie John III
The final chapter in the Katie John saga, John v. United States84 (Katie
John III), involved a challenge to the 1999 rules promulgated by the
Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior implementing the ruling in
Katie John I.85 Specifically, Katie John and others asserted that the rules
defined “public lands” too narrowly by not including navigable waters
upstream and downstream of ANILCA CSUs.86 The court reaffirmed its
reliance on the federal reserved water rights doctrine, upholding Katie
John I and finding that the 1999 rules were consistent with its holding.87
C. Subsistence Management after Katie John
The Katie John trilogy was a battle over the subsistence resource
management regime in Alaska. However, Katie John was just one chapter
in the history of subsistence in the state. Prior to European arrival in 1741,
Alaska’s entire population was made up of indigenous people living a
subsistence lifestyle.88 The survival of this lifestyle was at stake when
ANCSA extinguished aboriginal title along with traditional hunting and
fishing rights in Alaska in exchange for land and monetary
compensation.89 ANILCA sought to preserve subsistence rights by
codifying a subsistence priority for rural Alaskans in Title VIII.90 Congress
placed primary responsibility for implementing this priority in the state,
with a federal right to step in if the state did not comply with the law
within a year.91 In anticipation of ANILCA, Alaska passed a subsistence
83. Id. at 1047.
84. 720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2013).
85. Id. at 1218.
86. Id. at 1223.
87. Id. at 1245.
88. Jack B. McGee, Subsistence Hunting and Fishing in Alaska: Does ANILCA’s
Rural Subsistence Priority Really Conflict with the Alaska Constitution? 27 ALASKA L.
REV. 221, 223 (2010).
89. Robert T. Anderson, Sovereignty and Subsistence: Native Self-Government
and Rights to Hunt, Fish, and Gather after ANCSA, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 187, 204 (2016).
90. ANILCA § 804, 94 Stat. at 2423.
91. See id. § 805(d), 94 Stat. at 2425 (“The Secretary shall not implement
subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section if within one year . . . the State enacts
and implements laws of general applicability which are consistent with . . .
sections 803, 804, and 805, such laws, unless and until repealed, shall supersede
such sections insofar as such sections govern State responsibility pursuant to this
title for the taking of fish and wildlife on the public lands for subsistence uses.”).
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priority law in 1978, and regulations promulgated under that law brought
Alaska into compliance with ANILCA.92
However, Alaska’s compliance did not last. In 1989, the Alaska
Supreme Court ruled in McDowell v. State that the state’s ANILCAcompliant rural subsistence priority violated Article VIII, Section 3 of the
Alaska Constitution.93 This provision guarantees that, “Wherever
occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to
the people for common use.”94 The court’s main complaint was with the
“crude” nature of the urban-rural dichotomy as a criterion for
establishing subsistence use.95 The court suggested “[a] classification
scheme employing individual characteristics would be less invasive of the
article VIII open access values and much more apt to accomplish the
purpose of the statute . . . .”96 However, Alaska did not act to replace the
unconstitutional rural priority with an alternative system.97 The federal
government stepped in to administer the subsistence priority on
ANILCA-defined public lands.98
This system persists because Alaska has never come back into
compliance with ANILCA. On public lands (including navigable waters
after Katie John), the federal government administers the rural subsistence
priority.99 The Federal Subsistence Management Board (FSMB) defines
who is eligible for the rural subsistence priority and creates regulations
regarding subsistence harvest.100 On non-public lands, the State of Alaska
administers its own subsistence management program.101 The rural
subsistence priority only applies on federally regulated waters. This
means that subsistence users must carefully consider whose jurisdiction
they are hunting and fishing under, imposing the costs of research and
possible mistakes on those users.
It is helpful to situate these subsistence programs in property law
concepts of commons management. Both the state and federal systems

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Anderson, supra note 89, at 214.
McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1989).
ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
McDowell, 785 P.2d at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
McGee, supra note 88, at 236.
Id.
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., OFFICE OF SUBSISTENCE MGMT., 2017/2019
FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE FISHERIES REGULATIONS 3 (effective Apr. 1, 2017–Mar. 31,
2019), https://www.fws.gov/uploadedFiles/Region_7/NWRS/Zone_1/Tetlin/
PDF/2017-2019_fisheries_regulations-web_reduced.pdf.
100. 50 C.F.R § 100.10(a), (d) (2019); LISA MAAS, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 1, https://www.fs.usda.gov
/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fseprd541305.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
101. MAAS, supra note 100, at 1.
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regulate the gear and methods that can be used for subsistence fishing.102
These are “rightway” regulations that use technology restrictions to place
a functional limit on the amount that can be harvested.103 By adding the
rural subsistence priority, the federal system incorporates a “keep-out”
regulation that restricts the number of people who can access the
resource.104

IV. THE STURGEON DECISIONS
On his quest to use his hovercraft in the Yukon-Charley preserve,
John Sturgeon went to the Supreme Court twice. Grappling with many of
the same issues as the Ninth Circuit in the Katie John trilogy, the Court
arrived at a final answer regarding the proper statutory interpretation of
section 103(c). However, the Court’s solution does not resolve underlying
tensions regarding subsistence management in Alaska. The perpetual
push and pull between the state and the federal government will
continue, but the Sturgeon II decision may present an opportunity for
increased cooperation and compromise.
A. Sturgeon I
In 2013, the district court ruled against Sturgeon, holding that since
none of the regulations Sturgeon challenged applied “solely” to public
lands within ANILCA CSUs, they were not precluded by section 103(c).105
The Court found it dispositive that the regulations applied to NPS units
nationwide, not just in Alaska.106 This narrow interpretation left NPS free
to regulate inholdings in ANILCA parks as long as their regulations
applied generally to NPS property in all fifty states. The court did not
reach the question of whether the Nation River and other navigable
waters within CSUs were “public lands.”107 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
102. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5 § 39.105 (2019) (documenting the gear
allowed by state law); see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., OFFICE OF SUBSISTENCE
MGMT., supra note 99, at 83 (listing the allowable gear for subsistence fishing).
103. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies
for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1991).
104. See id. (defining available methods of managing common resources).
105. Sturgeon v. Masica, No. 3:11-cv-0183-HRH, 2013 WL 5888230, at *8 (D.
Alaska Oct. 30, 2013) (“None of those regulations was adopted ‘solely’ to address
entry upon or use of various equipment on public lands within ANILCA-created
conservation units such as Yukon-Charley and Katmai.”).
106. Id. at *9 (“[The regulations banning hovercrafts and helicopters] are
regulations of general applicability across the entirety of the NPS.”).
107. Id. at *7 (“[W]e need not decide here which if any of the correlative rights
with respect to the navigable waters (as distinguished from submerged lands) of
the Nation and Alagnak Rivers are owned by the State or the United States, or
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affirmed the district court’s ruling and its interpretation of ANILCA
section 103(c).108 Like the district court, the circuit court did not reach the
question of whether navigable waters within CSUs were “public lands”
for the purposes of ANILCA.109 Finally, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court,
rejecting the lower courts’ construction of the statute and remanding the
case for consideration of the broader “public lands” issue.110
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling
On remand, the Ninth Circuit finally reached the central issue of
whether navigable waters are included in “public lands” under
ANILCA.111 By the time the court decided this iteration of the section
103(c) issue, the competing interests and interpretations had been
thoroughly hashed out in the Katie John decisions. Nonetheless, the court
performed its own analysis of the role section 103(c) plays in the ANILCA
system, finding that ANILCA contemplates at least some NPS interest in
non-public lands.112 Judge Nguyen concluded that the Katie John cases
were binding and decided the issue based on the federal government’s
interest in the federal reserved waters doctrine.113
While the Ninth Circuit’s holding was relatively straightforward,
there are two additional aspects of the opinion that are worth
highlighting. First, the court recognized the importance of having a
consistent definition of “public lands” throughout ANILCA.114 Second,
Judge Nguyen took the unusual step of authoring an opinion concurring
with her own majority opinion, characterizing the result as
“unfortunate.”115 The concurring opinion echoes the critiques of Katie John
whether such interests are or are not public land.”).
108. Sturgeon v. Masica, 768 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In short, then, the
hovercraft ban is not one that ‘appli[es] solely to public lands within [CSUs]’ in
Alaska.”).
109. Id. at 1077–78 (“[E]ven assuming (without deciding) that the waters of and
lands beneath the Nation River have been ‘conveyed to the State’ for purposes of
§ 103(c), that subsection does not preclude the application and enforcement of the
NPS regulation at issue.”).
110. Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1072 (2016).
111. Sturgeon v. Frost, 872 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2017).
112. See id. at 932 (“ANILCA recognizes that the federal government retains
an interest in at least some otherwise non-public lands.”).
113. Id. at 934 (“We are bound under our Katie John precedent to reach a similar
conclusion here.”).
114. Id. (“It would be anomalous if we treated the regulation at issue in Katie
John III regarding the geographic scope of regulations implementing Title VIII as
employing a different construction of ‘public lands’ than applicable elsewhere in
ANILCA.”) (internal citations omitted).
115. Id. at 937 (Nguyen, J., concurring).
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that were present throughout the original litigation. According to Judge
Nguyen:
A reserved water right is the right to a sufficient volume of water
for use in an appropriate federal purpose. This case has nothing
to do with that. Rather, it is about the right to regulate navigation
on navigable waters within an Alaska national preserve. That is
a Commerce Clause interest and should be analyzed as such.116
As this critique suggests, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sturgeon II
represented a microcosm of the Katie John saga. At least for Judge Nguyen,
the Katie John precedent remained an “inherently unsatisfactory”
resolution to a complex problem.117
C. The Supreme Court Weighs in Again
Sturgeon II118 finally gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to
decide whether navigable waters in Alaska’s CSUs are “public lands”
under ANILCA. The Court took the opportunity to overturn the Ninth
Circuit’s holding and to reject its approach to the problem. Writing for the
Court, Justice Kagan began from the premise that federal reserved water
rights are usufructuary and do not confer title in the traditional sense.119
The Court found this fact decisive with regard to the “public lands”
question. Reflecting on the Katie John decisions, this approach brings to
mind Judge Kozinski’s textualist dissent in Katie John II.120 The Court’s
conclusion bars enforcement of NPS regulations in Alaska CSUs’
navigable waters. Justice Kagan points out that the Court’s holding is
consistent with ANILCA’s “grand bargain” because it “provide[s] an
‘assurance’ that [inholding owners] would not be subject to all the
regulatory constraints placed on neighboring federal properties.”121 This
conclusion also offers a reading of ANILCA that is consistent with
traditional conceptions of federal water law.122 On its surface, the Court’s
resolution of Sturgeon II is a cut and dried construction of ANILCA, but
two additional factors complicate the matter.
First, Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice
116. Id. (Nguyen, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
117. See Alaska v. Babbit, 72 F.3d 698, 704 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the
holding in Katie John I is frustrating because of the administrative burden and
potential confusion it creates).
118. Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019).
119. Id. at 1079.
120. John v. United States, 247 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(Kozinski, J., concurring
121. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1084.
122. FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 247 n.10 (1954).
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Ginsburg that takes issue with the presumed implications of the
majority’s holding. On narrow statutory construction grounds, Justice
Sotomayor agrees that navigable waters are not public lands under
ANILCA. 123 However, Justice Sotomayor dove headlong into two sources
of NPS authority the majority did not discuss. The most significant of
these is the authority to regulate out-of-park areas when it is necessary
and proper to protect in-park areas.124 Here, this authority would allow
NPS to regulate on navigable waters where it is necessary and proper to
uphold the purposes of a CSU.
Justice Sotomayor is confident that this power exists and can be
exercised in Alaska because “Congress must have intended for the Park
Service to have at least some authority over navigable waters within
Alaska’s parks.”125 She calls upon several examples of ANILCA’s focus
on “rivers and river systems.”126 This argument is compelling because it
seems unlikely that Congress would call upon NPS to, for instance,
“maintain the environmental integrity of the Charley River basin,
including streams, lakes and other natural features”127 if the NPS has no
authority to regulate navigable waters in CSUs.128 This argument leaves
open the possibility that NPS could reassert regulations like the
hovercraft ban by citing its out-of-park authority.
Second, the Court in Sturgeon II avoids fully addressing the Katie John
trilogy. In a footnote, citing to the briefs of the State of Alaska and the
Ahtna Native Alaskan corporation, the Court says that ANILCA’s
subsistence fishing provisions are “not at issue in this case.”129 As such,
the Court “do[es] not disturb the Ninth Circuit’s holdings that the Park
Service may regulate subsistence fishing on navigable waters.”130 Though
the Court does not belabor this point, its holding means that “public
lands” has different meanings in different parts of ANILCA.131 As
addressed below, this inconsistency poses challenges for regulatory
consistency.

123. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1088 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1089.
126. Id.
127. 16 U.S.C. § 410hh(10) (2018).
128. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1089 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 1080 n.2.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1079–80,1082 (defining “public lands” to mean lands where the
federal government holds title to a reserve water right and to mean any federally
owned land).
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V. RESPONSES TO STURGEON
A. Alaska’s Response to Increased Sovereignty
The State of Alaska’s reaction to Sturgeon II was overwhelmingly
positive. The state has long viewed the turf war over navigable waters in
CSUs as an issue of sovereignty.132 Governor Dunleavy released an
effusive statement praising the ruling and saying, “Today’s ruling
represents an important moment for Alaska’s sovereignty and the rule of
law.”133 Department of Fish and Game Commissioner Doug Vincent-Lang
was equally pleased because “[Alaska’s] waterways are our lifeblood.
Management authority impacts fishing, hunting, transportation and
economic development—all the things Alaskans hold dear. With this
decision the state can continue to do what it does best: manage Alaska’s
resources for the benefit of all Alaskans.”134 Clearly, the state views the
decision as a win and is happy to take on more influence over CSUs.
Alaska’s federal lawmakers also supported the decision and
congratulated Sturgeon on his victory.135 Senator Lisa Murkowski was
careful to specify that she appreciated the Court’s refusal to overturn the
Katie John decisions.136 The state was not specific about the implications of
the decisions in the near term, but it seems that the provisions of the
Alaska Administrative Code will replace NPS regulations as the
governing law on the navigable waters in CSUs.137
B. Alaska Native Responses
Before the Supreme Court, the Native American Rights Fund
(NARF) joined an amicus brief that advocated for the Katie John approach
to be extended in Sturgeon II.138 This position was likely motivated by the
132. See Press Release, Alaska Dep’t of Law, U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to
Hear Sturgeon Case on Alaska Water Rights (June 18, 2018) (“The State will
continue to defend our sovereign rights and the best interests of Alaskans.”),
http://www.law.alaska.gov/press/releases/2018/061818-Sturgeon.html.
133. Press Release, Governor Michael J. Dunleavy, Supreme Court Rules 9-0
in Favor of John Sturgeon and Alaska’s Rights (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://gov.alaska.gov/newsroom/2019/03/26/supreme-court-rules-9-0-infavor-of-john-sturgeon-and-alaskas-rights/.
134. Id.
135. Press Release, Senator Lisa Murkowski, Alaska Congressional Delegation
Welcomes Supreme Court’s Unanimous Decision on Sturgeon Case (Mar. 26,
2019),
https://www.murkowski.senate.gov/press/release/alaskacongressional-delegation-welcomes-supreme-courts-unanimous-decision-onsturgeon-case-.
136. Id.
137. See Governor Michael J. Dunleavy, supra note 133.
138. Brief for Alaska Native Subsistence Users as Amici Curiae Supporting
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desire to maintain the hard-won victories of Alaska Natives and
subsistence users through the Katie John litigation. Though the Supreme
Court rejected the arguments advanced by NARF, the Alaska Native
responses to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sturgeon II have been widely
positive.139
The Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) released a statement
praising the Sturgeon decision, saying the organization viewed the ruling
“favorably.”140 The Court’s decision to leave the Katie John decisions
undisturbed was especially important to AFN.141 Ahtna, a Native Alaskan
corporation, also approved of the decision despite filing an amicus brief
that did not reflect the Court’s ultimate conclusion.142
While Alaska Native reactions to Katie John precedent’s survival
were positive, they recognized that challenges remain. AFN said, “The
real problem of dual federal-state management of Alaska’s fish and game
resources remains unsolved.”143
C. Parks Service
The NPS response to the Sturgeon II ruling has been muted thus far.
Immediately following the ruling, the NPS said it was “determin[ing]
what changes will be necessary to bring existing policy in line with
today’s ruling.”144 The National Parks Conservation Association, a
nonprofit group focused on preserving national parks, voiced more
disappointment.145 Though NPS has not said as much, the Sturgeon
decision does leave the federal government in something of a
conundrum. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in concurrence, ANILCA

Respondents, Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019) (No. 17-949).
139. AFN Responds to Supreme Court’s Decision on Sturgeon Case, THE DELTA
DISCOVERY, Apr. 3, 2019, https://deltadiscovery.com/afn-responds-to-supremecourts-decision-on-sturgeon-case/.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Press Release, Ahtna, Inc., Ahtna Issues Statement in Response to U.S.
Supreme Court Sturgeon Decision (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.ahtnainc.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2019-AHTNA-MEDIARELEASE_Sturgeon-Decision_FINAL.pdf.
143. AFN Responds to Supreme Court’s Decision on Sturgeon Case, supra note 139.
144. Zaz Hollander, Supreme Court Backs Alaska Moose Hunter Over Park Service
but Steers Clear of Katie John, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 26, 2019,
https://www.adn.com/outdoors-adventure/2019/03/26/supreme-courtbacks-alaska-moose-hunter-over-park-service-in-broad-ruling-on-jurisdiction/.
145. Press Release, Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, Supreme Court Ruling
Green-Lights Hovercraft Use in Alaska National Park (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://www.npca.org/articles/2135-supreme-court-ruling-green-lightshovercraft-use-in-alaska-national-park.
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calls on NPS to preserve many of the rivers in CSUs.146 This task will be
difficult if not impossible with only the authority to control the lands
surrounding those waters. The approach NPS takes to solving this puzzle
will have important implications for the future of Alaska resource
management.
Jim Adams, the regional director of the NPS in Alaska, seemed
willing to pursue the alternative regulatory routes offered in the
Sotomayor concurrence.147 He commented that opinion “makes it clear
that the park service still has the authority to protect park lands from
resource damage.”148 At the same time, he recognized the Sturgeon II
decision as an opportunity for collaboration, saying “[the ruling] give[s]
the Park Service a voice in management of the river and it gives the state
a voice in management of the river [a]nd the challenge and the
opportunity the agencies have now moving forward is to work
together.”149
This spirit of cooperation is key if the issues left open following the
Sturgeon II opinion are to be resolved. The NPS could attempt to reinstate
all or most of their existing regulations under the authorities suggested in
the Sotomayor opinion. However, this recalcitrant approach would
almost certainly lead to more litigation, prolonging a courtroom battle
that has lasted almost a decade already. As AFN Subsistence Committee
Chairman Tom Tilden noted, “Litigation is no place to solve our resource
management problems.”150

VI. LIFE AFTER STURGEON II
A. Vulnerability of Katie John Precedent
While the Supreme Court “d[id] not disturb”151 the Katie John trilogy
in its Sturgeon II opinion, it is not entirely clear where the Katie John cases
stand in a post-Sturgeon world. On one hand, it seems that the Court
adopted the State of Alaska’s assertion that “public lands” should mean
something different in subsistence and non-subsistence contexts.152 On
the other hand, the Supreme Court adopted an unambiguous definition

146. Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1089 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
147. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, supra note 145.
148. Id.
149. Lauren Maxwell, ‘Our Parks are Different:’ Sturgeon Hails Supreme
Court Ruling, KTVA, Mar. 26, 2019, https://www.ktva.com/story/40200421/
our-parks-are-different-sturgeon-hails-supreme-court-ruling.
150. AFN Responds to Supreme Court’s Decision on Sturgeon Case, supra note 139.
151. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1080 n.2 (2019).
152. See id.
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of “public lands” that repudiates the Katie John Courts’ approach.153 At the
very least, the Sturgeon and Katie John cases coexist uneasily. Their
apparent conflict adds another layer of complication to the regulation of
navigable waters in CSUs. The federal government lacks the power to
impose NPS regulations on those waters under the Sturgeon II decision
but is required to regulate subsistence and uphold the rural subsistence
priority under Katie John and Title VIII of ANILCA.154 This situation
further blurs the line between federal and state authority. Any judicial
solution to this problem will be fraught with thorny issues.
B. Potential Judicial Solutions
1. The End of Katie John
One route for the courts would be to do away with the Katie John
doctrine. This approach would be consistent with the Sturgeon majority’s
implication that the federal reserved waters doctrine does not customarily
confer “title.”155 ANILCA initially assigned primary responsibility for
subsistence management to the states, so state management would also
be consonant with the statute.156 However, state management would run
squarely into the state constitutional law issues that led to federal
management in the first place.157 Without a state constitutional
amendment or reinterpretation of McDowell, a state-run subsistence
management system would remain noncompliant with ANILCA.158
2. The Imperfect Status Quo
Another path would be to continue defining “public lands”
differently with regard to subsistence use and non-subsistence
management. This appears to be the state of affairs after Sturgeon II.159 The
legal viability of this interpretation relies on the ability to interpret a
statutorily defined term differently in separate contexts within the same
statutory scheme. The leading cases establishing this principle, cited by
the State of Alaska in Sturgeon, concern the use of broad terms (i.e. “air
pollutant”).160 These kinds of terms lend themselves to flexible
153. Id. at 1076–77.
154. Id. at 1084–85.
155. See id. at 1079 (“[T]he more common understanding . . . is that ‘reserved
water rights are not the type of property interests to which title can be held’ . . . .”)
(quoting Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 965 (Alaska 1995)).
156. ANILCA § 805(d), 94 Stat. at 2424.
157. McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1989).
158. See id.
159. See generally Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019).
160. See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (“A given
term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association with
distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies. The point
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interpretation. In addition, the structure of a comprehensive statute
largely implemented by one agency provides a hospitable environment
for some internal inconsistency. When the Environmental Protection
Agency defines the term “air pollutant” to include greenhouse gases in
one Clean Air Act context, but excludes them in another, the agency can
work internally to ensure this difference does not create confusion.
The navigable waters in ANILCA CSUs present different
considerations. The costs to administrability will likely be higher where
the statutory term in question (i.e. “public lands”) is decisive as to
whether the state or federal government has jurisdiction. Defining “public
lands” differently within ANILCA subjects the same navigable waters to
two regulatory authorities. The deciding factor would be subsistence
management, federally regulated under the Katie John definition, and
non-subsistence management, regulated by the State under the Sturgeon
II definition.161
While these two regimes might not directly contradict each other,
their separate goals could lead to conflict. The federal subsistence
management program strives to preserve resources for subsistence use by
rural Alaskans.162 The State of Alaska administers its programs to
promote open access.163 These goals seem primed to lead to continued
federal-state tension. Further, NPS regulations will no longer apply on the
CSU navigable waters that the federal government will still manage for
subsistence.164 To the extent that NPS regulations implicitly supported
subsistence use, perhaps by prohibiting access by means such as

is the same even when the terms share a common statutory definition, if it is
general enough . . . .”).
161. See John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[F]ederally
reserved water rights may be enforced to implement ANILCA’s rural subsistence
priority as to waters within and ‘immediately adjacent to’ federal reservations,
but not as to waters upstream and downstream from those reservations. . . . [T]he
federal reserved water rights doctrine might apply upstream and downstream
from reservations in some circumstances, were there a particularized enforcement
action for that quantity of water needed to preserve subsistence use in a given
reservation, where such use is a primary purpose for which the reservation was
established.”); Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1080 n.2 (2019) (holding that
navigable waters within ANILCA CSUs are non-public lands subject to local
control, but leaving the federal subsistence management regime intact).
162. See ANILCA §§ 801–16, 94 Stat. at 2422–2430 (1980) (establishing the
subsistence priority).]
163. See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 3 (providing for open access to Alaska’s
land and waters).
164. See Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1087 (2019) (“But [non-public lands] did not
become subject to new regulation by the happenstance of ending up within a
national park. In those areas, Section 103(c) makes clear, Park Service
administration does not replace local control.”); see also 36 C.F.R §§ 2.1–2.62
(regulating activities in National Parks).
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hovercrafts, that synergy will no longer exist.165
Each of these judicial solutions, including the status quo, leaves
serious questions unanswered. None of them is ideal. In the short term,
both the state and NPS have the opportunity push their positions
aggressively in the courts. The State could attack the Katie John decisions,
using Sturgeon II as ammunition. Likewise, NPS could seize on the
Sotomayor concurrence to assert out-of-park authority and reinstate
regulations on CSU navigable waters that the State would surely
challenge. Either of these approaches would likely entail protracted
litigation. This battle would be unlikely to result in the best solution for
either party. It is time for a truce in the ANILCA jurisdiction wars.

VII. COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT AS A POLICY SOLUTION
If the courts are not the place to find a solution for ANILCA’s
jurisdictional problems, the state and federal governments, along with
Alaska Native stakeholders, will have to work together to solve their
problems. The most promising avenue to reach a satisfactory outcome for
all parties, allowing for subsistence use, conservation, and state
sovereignty, is cooperative management. The State has called for greater
cooperation with the federal government across a range of resource
management issues.166 The Department of the Interior has also expressed
a desire to be a better “neighbor” to the states by engaging in collaborative
management.167 ANILCA provides several opportunities for this kind of
cooperation, including conservation and management plans,168 the
Alaska Land Use Council (ALUC),169 and approval of memoranda of
understanding.170 Cooperative efforts between the federal and state
governments could lead to further synchronization of subsistence
management. Ultimately, these efforts could prompt substantive changes
in state law that would allow for the ANILCA compliant state subsistence
management the law’s framers envisioned.

165. See 36 C.F.R. § 3.8(a)(1) (prohibiting the use of airboats).
166. Letter from Doug Vincent-Lang, Acting Comm’r, Alaska Dep’t of Fish &
Game, to David Bernhardt, Deputy Comm’r, Dep’t of the Interior (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://www.peer.org/assets/docs/ak/1_8_19_Transmittal_ltr.pdf (transmittal
letter); see also Attachment to Letter from Doug Vincent-Lang, (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://www.peer.org/assets/docs/ak/1_8_19_Full_list_demands.pdf
(attachments).
167. JASON HAYES, MACKINACK CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, CONFLICT TO
COOPERATION: COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL LANDS IN MICHIGAN 11–
12 (2018), https://www.mackinac.org/archives/2018/s2018-07.pdf.
168. ANILCA § 1301, 94 Stat. at 2472–73 (1980).
169. Id. § 1201.
170. Id. § 809.

JONES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

THE IMPACT OF STURGEON II

4/29/2020 5:40 PM

243

A. Conservation and Management Plans
Section 1301 of ANILCA requires the preparation of conservation
and management plans for each ANILCA National Park and preserve
within five years.171 Section 304(g)(1) requires a comprehensive
conservation plan for each national refuge.172 These requirements
prompted a deluge of planning after the Act’s passage that limited the
capacity for meaningful participation by sheer scale.173 While NPS has
updated some of these plans,174 others, including the conservation and
management plan for the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, have
not been updated since their publication in the 1980s.175 More than thirty
years later, the time is ripe to revisit these plans. Sturgeon II gives the state
expanded sovereignty over rivers that the federal government is required
to conserve under ANILCA.176 This expanded sovereignty calls for
increased coordination with the federal government. Reopening the
management plan process for updates offers a perfect opportunity for
state, federal, and Alaska Native stakeholders to be heard through the
notice and comment process.
Rather than enacting regulations directly, the federal government
can seek to reach their goals through state policy. For instance, the State
has the capacity to enact common sense regulations on the kinds of
vessels can be used on CSU rivers.177 If the State implements such policies,
both the conservation and state sovereignty aspects of ANILCA can be
fully realized. These kinds of compromises have the potential to grow
from the management plan process. The NPS should adopt a policy of
systematically reviewing and reopening the management plans for the
CSUs in Alaska over the next ten years, beginning with those that have
not been revisited since their publication.

171. Id. § 1301.
172. Id. § 304(g)(1).
173. Thomas J. Gallagher, Native Participation in Land Management Planning in
Alaska, 41 ARCTIC 91, 94 (1989).
174. See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., CONSOLIDATED MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR DENALI
NATIONAL PARK (last updated 2006), https://www.nps.gov/dena/learn/
management/upload/GMP-Consolidated-Final.pdf.
175. See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., YUKON-CHARLEY RIVERS NATIONAL PRESERVE
GENERAL
MANAGEMENT
PLAN
(1985),
https://parkplanning.nps.gov/
document.cfm?parkID=22&projectID=34502&documentID=3808.
176. See e.g., ANILCA § 202(2) (“The monument addition and preserve shall
be managed . . . to maintain unimpaired the water habitat for significant salmon
populations . . . .”).
177. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 20.860(b) (2019) (limiting the power of
motors allowed in the Kenai River Special Management Area to 50 horsepower).
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B. Reviving ALUC
ANILCA established ALUC to provide a forum for federal agencies,
state government, and Alaska Native interests to collaborate and voice
their opinions on issues regarding land management in Alaska.178 ALUC
was comprised of a presidential appointee, the Governor of Alaska, the
Alaska office heads of several federal agencies including NPS and FWS,
and two representatives selected by Alaska Native corporations.179 The
Council did not have much in the way of regulatory authority; its main
function was to make recommendations to the state and federal
governments.180 However, ALUC did convene a representative body that
included many of the major parties concerned with Alaska land
management.181 The Council also recommended cooperative planning
zones where “the management of lands or resources by one member
materially affects the management of lands or resources by another . . .
.”182 This kind of body could work to facilitate collaboration that would
alleviate some of the remaining federal-state tensions in the wake of
Sturgeon II.
Unfortunately, ANILCA included a sunset provision that disbanded
ALUC after ten years absent congressional action.183 Reconstituting
ALUC would be timely, because a state body that performed a similar
function, the Citizens Advisory Council on Federal Areas, recently lost
state funding.184 In 2016, Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski introduced a bill
that would reinvigorate ALUC.185 State leaders like Senator John Coghill
have also called for a ALUC’s revival.186 Bringing back the Council would
not be a panacea. Its predecessor was plagued by the state-federal
competition that pervades Alaska land management.187 However, ALUC
at least creates a forum where collaboration can happen and compromises
must be made. Perhaps Sturgeon II could present an opportunity for a new
ALUC to designate cooperative management areas around navigable
178. ANILCA § 1201.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id. § 1201(c) (specifying membership of ALUC to include
representatives from federal and state organizations, and Alaska Native
corporations).
182. Id. § 1201(j)(1).
183. Id. § 1210(l).
184. Sam Friedman, Gov. Walker’s Budget Veto Closes State Federal Overreach
Panel, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, July 2, 2016, http://www.newsminer.com/
news/local_news/gov-walker-s-budget-veto-closes-state-federal-overreachpanel/article_fb6cb850-40f2-11e6-9cc7-a36712131ef4.html.
185. Alaska Land Use Planning Act, S. 3005, 114th Cong. (2016).
186. Friedman, supra note 184.
187. Gallagher, supra note 173, at 93.

JONES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

THE IMPACT OF STURGEON II

4/29/2020 5:40 PM

245

waters. This could help both parties meet their goals. While it would
require an act of Congress, reinstating ALUC would be a step in the right
direction for cooperative management in Alaska CSUs.
C. Memoranda of Understanding
Section 809 of ANILCA authorizes cooperative subsistence
management plans by saying, “The Secretary may enter into cooperative
agreements or otherwise cooperate with other Federal agencies, the State,
Native Corporations, other appropriate persons and organizations . . . to
effectuate the purposes and policies of this [title].”188 These agreements
take the form of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the
federal government and other interested parties.189 In the past, the Federal
Subsistence Management Board operated under an MOU with the State
of Alaska that provided an outline of federal-state relations in subsistence
management.190 However, this MOU expired.191 Efforts to revive the
MOU commenced in 2016, but they do not seem to have resulted in a final
agreement.192 A new MOU would normalize federal-state relations and
make coordinating with other parties easier.193
Beyond federal-state relations, MOUs for subsistence comanagement between the federal government and Alaska Native groups
has seen some success. A Memorandum of Agreement between the
Department of Interior and the Ahtna Native Corporation allows for
greater Alaska Native input regarding moose and caribou hunting and
188. ANILCA § 809.
189. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between United States Department
of the Interior and Ahtna Inter-Tribal Resource Commission for a Demonstration
Project for Cooperative Management of Customary and Traditional Subsistence
Uses in the Ahtna Region (2016), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov
/files/uploads/ahtna_doi_moa_with_signature_pages_final.pdf.
(citing
ANILCA as supporting authority for a wildlife management partnership between
the United States Department of the Interior and the Ahtna Inter-Tribal Resource
Commission).
190. FED. SUBSISTENCE MGMT. BD., PUB. MEETING MATERIALS JANUARY 10-12,
2017
at
130,
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/
jan_2017_fsb_meeting_book_smallest.pdf.
191. Joaqlin Estus, Federal Subsistence Board Votes to Mend Alaska Relations,
ALASKA PUBLIC MEDIA, Jan. 19, 2016, https://www.alaskapublic.org/
2016/01/19/federal-subsistence-board-to-seek-agreement-with-state/.
192. Letter from Tim Towarak, Chair, Fed Subsistence Mgmt.t Bd., to Ted
Spraker and Tom Kluberton, Chairmen, Alaska Dep’t of Fish and Game Bds.
Support Section (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/
regulations/regprocess/gameboard/pdfs/2015-2016/work_session/fsb.pdf.
193. See Estus, supra note 191 (“[W]e’re not going to do much better to bring in
a third party when the first two parties aren’t necessarily in alignment or
agreement . . . .”) (quoting Daniel Sharp, Subsistence Coordinator, Alaska Office,
BLM).
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began the process of allowing the Ahtna Commission to administer hunts
for tribal members under the Federal Subsistence Management
Program.194 In the fisheries context, FWS has entered an MOU with the
Kuskokwim River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission.195 The MOU provides
for consultation with the Commission before FWS makes decisions about
the Kuskokwim salmon fishery.196 These MOUs have promise as tools for
increased cooperation and show a willingness on the federal
government’s part to work with stakeholders.197 However, these MOUs
do not include the State of Alaska, largely because the State cannot
allocate resources to one subgroup of Alaskans.198
The Federal Subsistence Board and the State could leverage the
section 809 MOU process in two ways to alleviate the tensions between
federal and state subsistence management systems. First, while the rural
subsistence priority remains an intractable problem between the state and
federal government, a new MOU could synchronize the “rightway”
regulations in the federal and state systems. For instance, it makes little
sense to have differing regulations of fishing gear in the federal and state
systems.199 This level of coordination would reduce the level of
inconsistency between the two regulatory regimes. Second, the federal
194. See Memorandum of Agreement Between United States Department of
the Interior and Ahtna Inter-Tribal Resource Commission for a Demonstration
Project for Cooperative Management of Customary and Traditional Subsistence
Uses in the Ahtna Region (2016), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov
/files/uploads/ahtna_doi_moa_with_signature_pages_final.pdf (“This MOA
formalizes an agreement for the purpose of establishing a process and structure
as a demonstration project within the Federal Subsistence Management Program
that provides the AITRC with authority to cooperatively manage, within
parameters established by the Board, certain aspects of subsistence hunting on
Federal public lands by rural residents who are members of the eight federally
recognized tribes in the Ahtna region.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, Interior and Ahtna Intertribal Resource Commission Agree to
Cooperative
Wildlife
Demonstration
Project
(Nov.
29,
2016),
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-and-ahtna-intertribal-resourcecommission-agree-cooperative-wildlife (announcing “a cooperative wildlife
management demonstration project on federal and Ahtna Corporation lands”).
195. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department
of the Interior U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Alaska Region and Kuskokwim River
Inter-Tribal
Fish
Commission
(2016),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/
doi.gov/files/uploads/kuskokwin_mou_final.pdf.
196. Charles Enoch, KRITFC Signs an MOU With USFWS, KYUK, (May 24,
2016), http://www.kyuk.org/post/kritfc-signs-mou-usfws.
197. Chris McDevitt, Equitable Co-Management on the Kuskokwim River 94
(Aug. 2018) (unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Alaska-Fairbanks),
https://scholarworks.alaska.edu/handle/11122/9676.
198. Id. at 90.
199. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 100.27 (2019) (detailing federal gear requirements for
subsistence fishing), with 5 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 39.105 (2019) (detailing
state gear requirements for subsistence fishing).
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government should continue to use the MOU process to offer a new
avenue for Alaska Native participation in policymaking. Though these
MOUs only affect federal subsistence management, they produce models
that could improve both federal and state policy in the future, especially
if state subsistence law undergoes changes.
D. Potential State Level Changes
The State of Alaska could take on the entirety of the subsistence
management program if it became compliant with the ANILCA Title VIII
subsistence priority. Compliance would end the awkward situation of
dual jurisdiction over navigable waters that seems to be the most likely
outcome of the Sturgeon II decision. There are three options open for
coming into compliance: 1) the Alaska Supreme Court overturns
McDowell and the State implements a rural priority, 2) the Alaska
Legislature passes a law that effectuates the rural priority without relying
on the distinction struck down in McDowell, or 3) Alaska passes a state
constitutional amendment making the rural subsistence priority a
constitutional right, or at least permissible.
The judicial route is unlikely. The equal access provisions of the
Alaska Constitution are clear.200 And in recent cases, the Alaska Supreme
Court has maintained its rigid interpretation of those clauses even as it
rules in favor of some community hunting and fishing rights. In Alaska
Fish & Wildlife Fund v. State,201 the court upheld a program that allowed
“community harvest permits” for “groups following a hunting pattern
similar to the one traditionally practiced by members of the Ahtna Tene
Nene’ community . . . .”202 However, in the same decision, the court
affirmed that “[the equal access provisions] ‘share at least one meaning:
exclusive or special privileges to take fish and wildlife are prohibited.’”203
The court has also allowed for the designation of fisheries as
“subsistence” fisheries where nonsubsistence use can be curtailed in
times of scarcity.204 However, this designation does not limit the fisheries’
200. See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“Wherever occurring in their natural state,
fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use.”); see also id.
§15 (“No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or
authorized in the natural waters of the State. . . .”); see also id. § 17 (“Laws and
regulations governing the use or disposal of natural resources shall apply equally
to all persons similarly situated with reference to the subject matter and purpose
to be served by the law or regulation.”).
201. Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State, 347 P.3d 97 (Alaska
2015).
202. Id. at 100.
203. Id. at 102 (quoting McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 6 (Alaska 1989)).
204. Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State Dep’t of Fish and
Game, 289 P.3d 903, 910 (Alaska 2012).
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use to rural residents, but rather to use by any Alaskan who is fishing for
subsistence.205 These cases demonstrate that while there is some flexibility
in how subsistence is regulated at the state level, the Alaska Supreme
Court has shown no inclination to revisit the urban-rural distinction
struck down in McDowell.
As the law stands now, the State likely cannot recognize the
ANILCA rural subsistence priority because of the McDowell precedent.206
However, even in McDowell, the court recognized that another criterion
might be specific enough to allow for an ANILCA compliant system that
passed state constitutional muster.207 Several efforts to do so arose in the
aftermath of the decision.208 At least one scholar has suggested that
ANILCA’s subsistence priority does not in fact restrict subsistence use to
only rural residents; thus, the State of Alaska could thread the needle to
create a complex tiered system of priority that satisfies ANILCA and the
equal access provisions.209 This kind of system is theoretically possible,
but its implementation would likely be difficult as a practical matter. In
addition, it would be difficult to determine ex ante whether the Alaska
Supreme Court would in fact uphold a new subsistence priority system.
A negative result in court would send the whole process back to square
one.
The most plausible and elegant state policy solution to bring the state
into ANILCA compliance would be a state constitutional amendment
guaranteeing rural Alaskan subsistence rights. Such an amendment
would be a simple “revisory” change, meaning it could be enacted
through a two-thirds vote of the legislature and approval by a majority of
voters.210 More serious changes, called revisions, require a constitutional
convention.211 This rural priority amendment would eliminate McDowell
205. Id. at 910 (Alaska 2012).
206. See McDowell, 785 P.2d at 9 (“[T]he requirement contained in the 1986
subsistence statute, that one must reside in a rural area in order to participate in
subsistence hunting and fishing, violates sections 3, 15, and 17 of article VIII of the
Alaska Constitution.”).. [10.9(a)]
207. See id. (“We are not called upon in this case to rule on what selection
criteria might be constitutional. It seems appropriate, however, to note that any
system which closes participation to some, but not all, applicants will necessarily
create tension with article VIII.”).
208. See FRANK NORRIS, ALASKA SUBSISTENCE: A NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
MANAGEMENT
HISTORY
163
(2002),
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/
alaskasubsistence/upload/Norris_For_Web.pdf (describing legislative attempts
to overcome the McDowell precedent).
209. McGee, supra note 88, at 254.
210. Letter from Bruce M. Botleho, Attorney Gen., State of Alaska and Joanne
Grace, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Frank Rue, Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game (Dec.
14,
2001),
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/opinions/opinions_2001/01022_2001op1.pdf.
211. Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 981 (Alaska 1999).
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as an obstacle to ANILCA compliance. This amendment would also serve
the interest of state sovereignty. After Sturgeon II, assuming that NPS does
not pursue aggressive out-of-park regulations, subsistence management
will be the last area where the state does not control navigable waters in
ANILCA CSUs. If the state became ANILCA compliant, it could take over
this responsibility and be the sole government in control of those waters.
This arrangement is actually the design that ANILCA set as the default,
before McDowell forced the federal government to step in.212 The State of
Alaska should pursue a rural subsistence priority amendment, ending the
confusing status quo for subsistence users and solidifying state authority
in CSU navigable waters.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The war over jurisdiction in Alaska’s CSUs has produced more
confusion than clarity. Sturgeon II has the potential to be yet another battle
in that long conflict or a turning point that leads to peace. If it is to be the
latter, the State of Alaska and the federal government must use Sturgeon
II to spark a more productive era of cooperation. ANILCA provides
several means of fostering cooperative management if the parties are
willing to use them. In addition, the state could take a major step forward
by finding a way, likely through a constitutional amendment, to become
compliant with Title VIII of ANILCA. This compliance would not be easy
to achieve, but it would remove one of the major underlying issues that
has made subsistence management in Alaska such an intractable
problem.

212. ANILCA § 805(d), 94 Stat. at 2425 (2018).

